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cial stability will be more difficult, if not impos-
sible, to achieve.
I’ll discuss evidence from both recent and
not-so-recent history that support my contention
that a sound monetary policy—that is, commit-
ted firmly to long-run price stability—is con-
ducive to financial stability and economic
growth. Some of this evidence is not pretty—it
shows how an unstable price level can wreck a
financial system and harm the real economy.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, especially David C. Wheelock, assistant
vice president in the Research Division, who
provided special assistance. However, I retain
full responsibility for errors.
SOUND MONETARY POLICY
I’ll begin by outlining the essence of sound
monetary policy and why I believe that sound
policy is a prerequisite for financial stability and
maximum economic growth. The foundation of
a sound monetary policy is long-run price stabil-
ity. By “price stability” I mean a low and stable
rate of inflation. I believe that the optimal rate of
inflation is zero, properly measured. However,
biases in price indexes imply that, in practice,
price stability will likely be consistent with a
small positive measured rate of inflation. These
biases arise from the difficulty of capturing
T
he Federal Reserve Act as amended in
1977 directs the Federal Reserve to
pursue monetary policies to achieve
the goals of “maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates.” The Federal Reserve and all central banks
have also long been expected to promote finan-
cial stability. Since the 19th century, central
banks have been expected to serve as lender of
last resort to the banking system.
The goals of maximum sustainable employ-
ment and economic growth, stable prices, mod-
erate interest rates, and financial stability are too
often viewed as incompatible with one another.
Conventional wisdom holds, for example, that if
monetary policy is too focused on controlling
inflation, then output and employment growth
will likely fall below their potential and financial
markets will be less stable than they otherwise
could be.
Today, I will elaborate on how I see inflation,
financial stability and economic growth fitting
together in a coherent framework for monetary
policy. I do not subscribe to the conventional
wisdom. Neither events nor economic theory
support the notion that a monetary policy directed
toward price stability will result in a less stable
financial system or an underperforming real
economy. Rather, in my view, price stability,
financial stability and economic growth are
mutually consistent goals for monetary policy.
Further, I believe that price stability must be the
paramount objective for monetary policy because
without price stability, the goals of maximum
employment, moderate interest rates and finan-improvements in the quality of goods and serv-
ices, as well as substitutions among products
that comprise consumers’ total purchases. Differ-
ences in how price indexes are put together imply
that the specific rate of inflation that is consis-
tent with price stability will likely vary across
countries and over time. For the United States,
I’ll hazard a guess that zero true inflation trans-
lates to an annual rate of increase in the CPI of
about 1 percent and in the broader price index
for personal consumption expenditures of about
0.5 percent.
By price stability, I do not mean that the
price index is constant. Monetary policy could
never eliminate high-frequency movements in
the inflation rate; nor should policymakers try to
do so. Price stability means that inflation is suf-
ficiently low and stable as not to influence the
economic decisions of households and firms.
When inflation is low and reasonably stable,
people do not waste resources attempting to pro-
tect themselves from inflation. They save and
invest with confidence that the value of money
will be stable over time.
A highly predictable financial environment
not only requires a low and stable rate of inflation
but also widespread understanding of how that
objective stated in general terms translates into
day-by-day monetary policy actions. Speaking
again in the U.S. context, it is more important
that policymakers agree on some relatively low
target rate of inflation than exactly on what that
rate is. A number of FOMC members have spoken
about a “comfort zone” of 1 to 2 percent inflation,
measured by the PCE price index excluding food
and energy—the so-called “core” inflation rate.
That statement is fully acceptable to me.1 My
way of stating my comfort zone is core inflation
of 1.5 percent per year, plus or minus a range of
0.5 percent to allow for unavoidable short-run
fluctuations. My statement is meant to indicate
that I would like monetary policy to aim at 1.5
percent core inflation and not just accept inflation
barely inside one end or the other of a 1 to 2 per-
cent range. As an aside, I would note that U.S.
monetary policy has come a long way over the
past 20 years, as indicated by the fact that I think
it worthwhile to talk about the difference between
a goal of 1.5 plus or minus 0.5 percent versus a
goal of 1 to 2 percent inflation.
In a market economy, consumers and firms
base their consumption and investment decisions
on information derived from prices, including
asset prices and returns. Efficient allocation of
economic resources depends on the clarity of
signals coming from the price system and, I might
add, the clarity of signals from governments and
central banks about economic policy. Uncertainty
about the aggregate price level muddies the waters
by making it difficult for firms and households
to determine whether changes in individual
prices reflect fundamental shifts in supply and
demand or merely changes in the overall rate of
inflation. By eliminating this uncertainty, a mon-
etary policy that is committed to long-run price
stability eliminates a potential drag on the effi-
cient allocation of resources and, hence, on eco-
nomic growth.
Long-run price stability contributes to finan-
cial stability in a similar fashion. An unstable
price level can lead to bad forecasts of real returns
to investment projects and, hence, to unprofitable
borrowing and lending decisions. Unexpected
bouts of inflation, for example, tend to encourage
optimistic forecasts of real returns. Errors in dis-
tinguishing nominal and real returns result in
misallocation of resources and eventually to
financial distress that would not have occurred
if the price level had been stable. Business deci-
sions based on expectations of continuing infla-
tion often turn out badly when inflation falls,
resulting in higher rates of loan defaults and
business failures. Outright deflation is particularly
notorious because a falling price level increases
the real cost of servicing outstanding debt.
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1 And has been for a long time. For a relatively recent example, see William Poole, “The Monetary Policy Model,” National Association of
Business Economics Annual Meeting (NABE), Boston, Massachusetts, September 11, 2006 [http://www.stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/
2006/PDF/09_11.pdf].Long-run price stability is the most powerful
tool the central bank has to promote economic
growth, high employment and financial stability.
Price stability also enables monetary authorities
to pursue secondary objectives. Worthwhile sec-
ondary goals for monetary policy include the
reduction of fluctuations in real economic activity
and the management of financial and/or liquidity
crises. I refer to these as secondary goals because
the central bank is unlikely to be successful at
limiting fluctuations in economic activity or con-
taining financial crises in the absence of price
stability. The reason is that, in the absence of
entrenched market expectations of long-run price
stability, based on a high degree of confidence in
the central bank, expansionary monetary policy
actions risk raising inflation expectations rather
than cushioning an economic or financial distur-
bance. Price stability must therefore be the prin-
cipal goal of policy. A central bank that invests
in achieving credibility will find that market
confidence yields a very high rate of return.
The Federal Reserve has faced a number of
challenges in recent history, including liquidity
shocks associated with the Asian financial crisis
and Russian government bond default in 1998,
and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The Fed’s ability to respond quickly and deci-
sively to the extraordinary demands for liquidity
during these events was enhanced by the fact
that inflation was low and expected by the pub-
lic to remain low. The public understood that in
providing additional liquidity during the crises
the Federal Reserve was not giving up on its pur-
suit of price stability over the long term.
Low inflation and contained inflation expec-
tations have also enhanced the Federal Reserve’s
ability to react effectively to business cycle fluc-
tuations. The Fed eased aggressively to encour-
age economic recovery from the 2001 recession.
Because the public had confidence in the Fed’s
commitment to price stability, we were able to
bring the target federal funds rate to its lowest
level in 40 years without triggering widespread
fears of higher inflation. If expected inflation
had risen as the Fed brought rates down, long-
term interest rates would likely have risen and
hampered efforts to encourage economic recov-
ery. Hence, price stability made the Fed’s actions
more effective than they otherwise would have
been.
LESSONS FROM U.S. ECONOMIC
HISTORY
Whereas recent experience supports the
view that price stability contributes to financial
stability and economic growth, there is no short-
age of evidence that an unstable price level leads
to financial instability and a poorly performing
real economy. Sadly, history is full of examples
where mismanaged monetary policy resulted in
financial instability and serious disruption of
economic activity. The experiences of the United
States during the Great Depression of the 1930s
and the Great Inflation of the 1970s provide two
such examples.
The Great Depression is a classic illustration
of how financial disruptions can wreak havoc on
the real economy. Policy mistakes by the Federal
Reserve were critical, as Milton Friedman and
Anna Schwartz demonstrated in their Monetary
History of the United States. The Fed’s principal
error was in failing to act as lender of last resort
to the banking system as banking panics swept
across the United States. The collapse of the bank-
ing system caused the money stock to contract
sharply, which caused the price level to fall.
Deflation drove up the real cost of servicing debt
and led to widespread business failures and
unemployment. Falling incomes and increased
loan defaults put further strain on banks and
other financial firms. Failure of the Federal
Reserve to act in timely fashion created a down-
ward debt-deflation spiral. More than 1,000 banks
were forced to suspend operations in each year
between 1930 and 1933.
The monetary hemorrhage finally ended
when the entire banking system, including the
Federal Reserve banks, was shut down by govern-
ment decree in March 1933. Once confidence in
the banking system had been restored, the money
stock and price level began to rise. The real
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encouraged increased business investment and
consumer spending, and the economy began to
recover.
The Great Depression illustrates how defla-
tion can wreck a financial system and economy.
The Great Inflation, by contrast, showed the
destructive power of inflation. Inflation began to
rise in the mid 1960s. It is interesting to compare
attitudes toward restrictive monetary policy in
the late 1960s and attitudes now. Forty years ago,
there was great concern in the United States that
higher interest rates would have an undue impact
on housing finance and housing construction;
that concern contributed to delays in needed
Federal Reserve policy actions that ended up
destabilizing the entire economy. Now, we under-
stand that monetary policy must concentrate on
the goal of aggregate economic stability and
especially inflation control. We regard stresses
in any particular industry as a problem for that
industry to deal with; those stresses are not an
issue for monetary policy, unless they spill over
to the economy more generally.
In the 1960s, political pressure for low inter-
est rates combined forces with a growing con-
sensus among economists and policymakers that
moderate inflation is an acceptable way to boost
employment and economic growth. Monetary
policymaking was viewed as simply a matter of
selecting from among a menu of inflation and
unemployment options. Choose a little more infla-
tion and unemployment would fall, according to
this theory. Accept somewhat higher unemploy-
ment, on the other hand, and inflation would be
a bit lower.
The infamous Phillips curve made policy-
making seem beguilingly simple. Based on this
theory, several influential economists argued
that the menu of inflation-unemployment options
offered by the Phillips curve could be improved
upon if policymakers were willing to discard
their old-fashioned attraction to price stability.
Forego price stability, these economists argued,
and the labor market would operate more effi-
ciently, employment would rise and the economy
would grow faster.
There were some notable dissents from this
view. Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps
argued strongly that inflationary policies could
not boost employment or economic growth in
the long run, and that attempts to do so would
produce ever higher inflation but no more
employment or growth than was possible with a
stable price level.
The views of Friedman and Phelps became
increasingly accepted in the 1970s as economists
came to appreciate the importance of expecta-
tions in the economic decision making of firms
and households. At a theoretical level, economists
showed formally that when the public comes to
expect that policymakers will attempt to use infla-
tion to boost employment or economic growth,
the public will respond in ways that prevent
employment or output from rising. For example,
if inflation is expected to rise, then workers will
demand higher nominal wages and savers will
demand higher nominal interest rates to prevent
real wages and interest rates from falling. Conse-
quently, once the public figures out the central
bank’s game, inflationary monetary policy will
have no effect on employment or output.
At an empirical level, as the 1970s progressed
the performance of the economy discredited the
notion that higher inflation could produce higher
employment and faster growth. If anything, the
data indicated just the opposite. As inflation
rose still higher and became more variable, the
average growth rate of the U.S. economy slowed
and business cycle fluctuations became more
pronounced.
Inflation, and especially inflation instability,
proved disruptive for financial markets and firms.
Initially the impact of the intensifying inflation
seemed benign with respect to financial markets
and financial stability. Below the surface, how-
ever, the rising inflation was interacting with the
financial regulatory structure that had been
established in the 1930s in response to the fail-
ures of the Great Depression.
Mutual savings banks and savings and loan
associations—the “thrift institutions”—had
become the mainstay of housing finance in the
United States after World War II. These financial
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classic duration mismatch. As inflation premiums
became built into market interest rates, short-term
interest rates rose much more rapidly than did
the return on the thrifts’ assets, which were
heavily invested in fixed-rate 30-year home
mortgages. By 1980, on a marked-to-market basis
the capital of a large portion of the thrift industry
was exhausted.
Although the industry was kept afloat for a
time by government sanctioned accounting
gimmicks, many thrifts were walking dead—
“zombies” some called them—that had to be
closed. Because the deposit liabilities of most
thrifts were federally insured, the collapse of the
industry was costly for taxpayers. The cleanup is
estimated to have cost U.S. taxpayers between
150 and 200 billion dollars. It is worth noting
that deposit insurance did function effectively
in maintaining the public’s confidence in the
banking system. Nevertheless, in the absence of
high inflation, the episode could largely have
been avoided.
Inflation declined sharply in the early 1980s,
thanks to a change in the course of monetary
policy under the leadership of Paul Volcker, then
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. The
decline was largely unanticipated. Because few
people expected inflation to remain contained,
real interest rates soared as savers continued to
demand high inflation risk premiums. The dollar
also appreciated sharply in world foreign exchange
markets. The strong dollar was hard on U.S.
exporters and particularly devastating for farmers
as the dollar prices of agricultural commodities
fell sharply. Many farmers had borrowed heavily
to purchase land during the 1970s when commod-
ity prices were soaring and land values were
appreciating rapidly. Falling commodity and
land prices in the 1980s left many farmers unable
to service their debts and many went bankrupt.
Losses on farm loans caused the failure of many
banks in agricultural regions of the United States.
This financial distress did not spread to the
economy as a whole, but did severely affect
farming regions.
The U.S. inflation environment was fairly
stable in early 1965, and fairly stable again in
1985. The 20 years in between saw the failure of
scores of banks and thrift institutions and of
thousands of farms and two deep recessions, in
1973-75 and 1981-82. Hundreds more thrift insti-
tutions were closed in the late 1980s and early
1990s when the U.S. government finally faced up
to the fact that they had exhausted their capital
during the Great Inflation.
The general principle common to these cases
of financial distress is that significant changes in
the inflation rate cannot be accurately foreseen.
Forecasting errors, and resulting financial loses
and bankruptcies, are inevitable when the price
level is unstable. In short, inflation and inflation




Although I have focused on U.S. experiences,
which I know best, many other countries have
seen the deleterious effects of price level instabil-
ity. Indeed, some have had far worse experiences
than the United States. Many lesser developed
countries have experienced very high rates of
inflation at one time or another, often with disas-
trous consequences for financial stability and
economic growth.
In a study of cross-country data, Robert Barro
found that high rates of inflation significantly
reduce economic growth, even after one controls
for such influences on growth as educational
attainment levels, the rule of law and strength of
democratic institutions.2 Michael Bruno and
William Easterly of the World Bank report similar
evidence. They find that inflation crises—which
they define as inflation rates on the order of 40
percent or more—produce significant shortfalls
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2 Robert Barro, “Inflation and Growth.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 1996, 78(3), pp. 153-69.in a country’s economic growth.3 For example,
when Chile’s inflation rate soared from an aver-
age rate of 27 percent between 1960 and 1971 to
an average rate of 240 percent between 1972 and
1977, the country’s already modest rate of per
capita output growth declined from just under
the world average to more than 5 percentage
points below the world average. Bruno and
Easterly show that other countries that have had
such inflationary bursts also experienced large
declines in output growth.
Perhaps the most obvious examples of the
destructive force of inflation are hyperinflations
in Germany after World War I, in various eastern
European countries after World War II and in
Latin America more recently. These were caused
by printing money to finance massive government
budget deficits. Hyperinflation was ended in
those countries by reforms that brought govern-
ment spending under control and credibly ended
the financing of deficits by printing money.
Economists have debated whether the termina-
tion of hyperinflations resulted in serious declines
in output. It is certain, however, that hyperinfla-
tion did not promote faster growth or financial
stability. Hyperinflations went hand in hand with
collapsing economies and financial markets.
Countries that have very high rates of infla-
tion typically have weak institutions, including
poor enforcement of contracts and property rights,
and inefficient tax systems (and consequently
large budget deficits). Many countries have made
efforts to improve their political and economic
institutions and are now experiencing lower
inflation and higher economic growth than they
did before their reforms.
Chile is one example of a country that appears
to have seen a direct benefit from implementing
pro-economic growth policies that include meas-
ures to control inflation. The executive board of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently
complimented Chile for its enviable economic
performance over the past 15 years, which the
IMF attributed largely to the implementation of
sound economic policies. During the 15 years
ending in 2005, Chile enjoyed an average GDP
growth rate of 5.5 percent, a tripling of its per
capita income in U.S. dollar terms, and a halving
of its poverty rate, all while keeping the lid on
inflation. The IMF cited Chile’s sound fiscal poli-
cies, its low barriers to international trade and
capital flows, sound financial regulatory and
supervisory framework, a floating exchange rate,
and its inflation-targeting framework for mone-
tary policy. These policies, the IMF argues, have
helped keep inflation and inflation expectations
low, sustained economic growth and helped
make the Chilean economy resilient to external
shocks.4
Like Chile, many countries have made price
stability the paramount objective of monetary
policy, and several have adopted formal inflation
targeting as a way of anchoring inflation expec-
tations. The advantage of adopting a formal
quantitative target for inflation, especially when
coupled with institutional reforms, such as
increased operating independence for central
banks, is that it reduces uncertainty about the
long-term inflation rate. This, in turn, reduces
inflation risk premiums in interest rates and pro-
motes long-term contracting and investment.
These benefits can be especially important for
countries that have had a history of high or
unstable inflation. However, I believe that any
country could benefit from announcing and
sticking to a specific numeric inflation objective.
CONCLUSION
I will conclude by noting that, over the past
20 years or so, the inflation record of the United
States and many other countries has been far
better than it was from the mid 1960s to the early
1980s. It is not a coincidence, I believe, that we
3 Michael Bruno and William Easterly, “Inflation and Growth: In Search of a Stable Relationship.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,
May/June 1996, 78(3), pp. 139-46.
4 “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2006 Article IV Consultation with Chile.” Public Information Notice no. 06/97. August 11, 2006.
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and financial stability over the recent two decades
than during the years of high and highly variable
inflation. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
has referred to the decline in the volatility of
both inflation and output over the past 20 years
as “The Great Moderation.”
During the recent past, our financial system
and economy have shown remarkable resilience
in the face of some serious shocks. I have already
mentioned the Asian financial crisis and Russian
government bond default in 1998, and the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. None of these had
more than a passing impact on U.S. financial
markets or firms or on the real economy. More
recently, we have seen little fallout from the end-
ing of the housing boom. At least thus far, only
the residential construction industry and closely
allied industries and professions have experi-
enced any significant effects of the slowing of
housing markets. Needless to say, I doubt that our
financial system or economy would show such
resilience if inflation were not low and stable.
Monetary policy is not magic. A stable cur-
rency is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for economic growth. A democratic government,
able to transfer power peacefully and reliably, is
essential to sustained prosperity. So also are
sound legal traditions and processes to resolve
disputes according to the law. Governments need
to pursue policies that encourage entrepreneur-
ial activity. A social safety net is important in
today’s world, but it must not destroy incentives
for firms to hire productive workers. In a market
economy, those who take risks should be rewarded
when they are successful and should suffer losses
when they are not. Monetary policy cannot offset
government policies destructive of the growth
process.
I finish by noting a common misunderstand-
ing. In many countries, including the United
States, there is the view that good times are often
associated with a little inflation, and bad times
with falling inflation or, especially, deflation. That
observation is correct but incomplete. A little
unexpected inflation is associated with temporary
good times but cannot last. Expectations catch
up with reality. As expectations and actual infla-
tion rise, the good times come to an end and
financial instability begins. As Milton Friedman
argued so brilliantly, for an economy operating
close to full employment, the trade-off is not
between inflation and unemployment but between
unemployment now and unemployment plus
inflation later.
Under the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed oper-
ates with a dual mandate, to encourage maximum
employment and price stability. Those goals are
not incompatible but fundamentally the same
goal. Maintaining low and stable inflation is cen-
tral to achieving maximum employment and the
highest possible rate of economic growth. Main-
taining price stability does not require that the
central bank come down hard on every upward
twitch in the inflation rate, but disciplined
response is required when the inflation rate
threatens to rise in a sustained fashion or fall
into deflation. Central bankers need to apply
their best judgment, and they will not always be
correct in those judgments. But if they have a
good record and the market retains confidence
that the central bank will correct its mistakes,
errors in judgment will not do lasting damage. I
myself rely heavily on market measures of infla-
tion expectations in forming my judgments and
in deciding what policy risks to run—in an uncer-
tain world, it is always the case that policy judg-
ments depend on probabilistic calculations.
I hope that I have persuaded you that finan-
cial stability and economic growth are enhanced
by price stability. But I know that actual experi-
ence in the United States, in Chile and in many
other countries is more persuasive that words
can ever be.
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